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(4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001)
L Facts
The body of seventeen-year-old Timothy Hall ("Hall") was discovered
on March 30, 1992, partially nude, lying facedown on a mattress under an
abandoned building. Autopsy reports revealed that Hall was stabbed more
than 143 times. Pubic hairs from an African-American were recovered
from Hall's buttocks and human semen was found on the mattress. Five
days after his body was discovered, police responded to complaints that a
man riding a bicycle in the area near the abandoned building assaulted a
juvenile. Police officers arrived at the scene and found Walter Mickens
("Mickens") riding a bicycle. Police detained Mickens and later arrested him
on charges related to the assault. After receiving his Miranda warnings,
Mickens agreed to talk to police. Officers questioned Mickens about Hall's
death. Detective Dallas Mitchell ("Mitchell") told Mickens that police knew
he had killed Hall. Mitchell did not tell Mickens how Hall had been killed,
but Mickens responded, "You didn't find any knife on me, did you?"' The
next day police obtained warrants charging Mickens with the attempted
sodomy and murder of Hall.2
At trial the Commonwealth introduced expert testimony that the
foreign pubic hairs collected from Hall's body were similar to pubic hair
samples taken from Mickens.' Analysis of stains found on the mattress at
the crime scene revealed the presence of human sperm. An RFLP type
DNA analysis revealed that the sperm could not have come from Hall, but
was consistent with Mickens's DNA pattern." Additionally, Tyrone Brister
("Brister") testified that he and Mickens shared a courthouse holding cell on
March 26, 1993. Brister testified that when he asked Mickens why he was
there, Mickens answered, "They said I stabbed somebody 140 something
1. Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203,206 (4th Cir. 2000), revtden ban, No. 00-4,2001
WL 133196, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 2001).
2. Id. On April 7, 1992, Michael Jacobs ("Jacobs") was found wearing the shoes that
Hall had been wearing when last seen alive. Jacobs testified that he purchased the shoes from




times in the head."' According to Brister, Mickens then lowered his voice
and added "which I did."6 A jury convicted Mickens of capital murder and
sentenced him to death.
Mickens's first petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was granted.' The Court remanded his case in light 6f the recent
decision in Simmons v. South Carolina.' On remand the Supreme Court of
Virginia determined that a resentencing was required.'" At the resentencing
in February of 1996, the jury again recommended that Mickens be sen-
tenced to death." The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the sentence and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 2 Mickens's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia on
December 15, 1997.1' Mickens was then appointed federal habeas counsel
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 4
Mickens's federal habeas counsel discovered that Mickens's lead trial
counsel, Bryan Saunders ("Saunders"), represented the victim prior to his
death." A clerk in the Newport News Juvenile and Domestic Relations
('JDR") Court gave habeas counsel access to Hall's confidential juvenile
records, which revealed that Saunders represented Hall at the time Hall was
killed. " Habeas counsel further discovered that Judge Aundria Foster of the
JDR court dismissed the charges pending against Hall on April 3, 1992, and
then appointed Saunders to represent Mickens in his trialfor the capital
murder of Hall only four days after Hall's death." Judge Foster did not
5. Id.
6. Id. at 207. Brister testified that Mickens also told Brister that he sodomized the
victim and stole his shoes. Id.
1 7. Id.;.see VA. CODE ANN. S 18;2-31(5) (Michie 2000) (defining capital murder as a
.willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or subse-
quent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object
sexual penetration").
8. Id.; see Mickens v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 922 (1994).
9. See Mickens, 513 U.S. 922 (1994). The United States Supreme Court vacated
Mickens's sentence and remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia to consider the implica-
tion of the holding in Simmons v. South Carolina. Id.; see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 171 (1994) (holding that when the state raises the specter of defendant's future
dangerousness due process requires that the jury be instructed that life imprisonment means
life without the possibility ofparole).
10. Mickens v. Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. 1995).




15. Id. at 207-08.
16. Id. Counsel discovered that Saunders represented Hall on charges of assault and
carrying a concealed weapon. Id.
17. Id.
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make any inquiry into whether Saunders had a conflict of interest in repre-
senting Mickens."
On June 25, 1998, Mickens filed a federal petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254.9 The petition alleged that Saunders labored under
a conflict of interest because he had previously represented Hall.2" The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the
petition and Mickens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit." On appeal, Mickens raised the following issues: (1) trial
counsel operated under a conflict of interest rendering counsel constitution-
ally ineffective; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failure to conduct an
adequate pre-trial investigation and failure to request a psychiatric examina-
tion prior to resentencing; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove
attempted forcible sodomy.'
The Fourth Circuit panel held the following: (1) that Mickens estab-
lished cause to excuse his failure to raise the conflict of interest claim in state
habeas proceedings;2 (2) that the JDR judge knew or should have known
that a conflict of interest existed and had a duty to inquire; 4 (3) that
Mickens did not waive his right to conflict-free counsel;"5 and (4) that trial
counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest.26 The court found
Mickens's claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove an attempted
sodomy to be defaulted.' The Fourth Circuit also held that trial counsel's
failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation and failure to obtain
a mental health expert did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.2
The judgment of the district court was reversed and a certificate of
appealability was issued. 9 The Fourth Circuit directed the district court to
grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the Commonwealth elected to retry
the defendant within 180 days." The Commonwealth was then granted a
18. Id.
19. Id. at 208; seealso Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, S 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2254 (2000))
(governing federal habeas petitions in death penalty cases).
20. Mickens, 227 F.3d at 208.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 209.
24. Id. at 209-11.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 212.






petition for rehearing en banc and the case was re-argued on December 5,
2000.3*
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed the decision of the district court.'
The court determined that Mickens established cause to excuse his proce-
dural default, but held that Mickens failed to demonstrate an adverse effect
resulting from trial counsel's conflict of interest.3 The court held that the
Supreme Court's decision in Wood v. Georgia4 does not relieve a defendant
from the burden of establishing that his attorney's conflict of interest
adversely affected his representation. As a result, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed Mickens's conviction for capital murder.
3 '
II. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Showing Cause and Actual Prejudice to Overcome Exhaustion and
Procedural Default
Cuyler v. Sullivan holds that the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel includes the right to representation free of conflicts of
interest." Mickens argued two theories to support his conflict of interest
claim: (1) the JDR court failed to inquire into defense counsel's conflict of
interest when it knew, or should have known, that the conflict existed; and
(2) trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest that prejudiced
the defendant.39 The Commonwealth argued that Mickens's claims were
31. Mickem, 2001 WL 133196, at -4.
32. Id., at *14.
33. Id.
34. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
35. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *14; see Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,269-74 (1981)
(holding that when trial court knows or reasonably should know of a potential conflict of
interest the trial court is obligated to inquire into the potential conflict).
36. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *14.
37. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
38. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980) (holding that a defendant may
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's conflict of interest
once the defendant can demonstrate an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect on
counsel's representation based on that conflict); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
484 (1978) (holding that trial court's failure to appoint separate counsel for multiple defen-
dants in the face of repeated assertions by counsel that potential for conflict of interest existed
violated defendants' due process rights).
39. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *5. The Fourth Circuit identified three grounds upon
which Mickens based his conflict of interest argument. The court found that Mickens based
his claims on the following: (1) the trial court's failure to inquire into conflicts of interest
which the court knew or reasonably should have known about required automatic reversal
of the conviction; (2) if the trial court's failure did not require automatic reversal then it
396 [Vol. 13:2
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barred under the exhaustion doctrine and were procedurally defaulted.'
The exhaustion doctrine precludes argument of a claim that is raised for the
first time in a petition for federal habeas corpus relief." Procedural default
bars a claim when the petitioner fails to exhaust available state remedies and
presentation of the claim to the state courts would be barred by the exhaus-
tion doctrine.42 Exhaustion and procedural default can be overcome by
showing cause and actual prejudice. One way in which the petitioner can
establish cause is by demonstrating that the factual basis of the petitioner's
claim did not exist when the petition for habeas was filed.44 The Fourth
Circuit agreed with the district court that Mickens established cause to
overcome his failure to exhaust the claim in state court."' The Common-
wealth argued that if federal habeas counsel was able to discover the factual
basis for Mickens's claim, then Mickens could have done the same when
preparing his state habeas petition.' The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded,
noting that federal habeas counsel was able to uncover the basis for
relieved Mickens of having to show an adverse effect from counsel's conflict of interest; and
J3) that Mickens established both a conflict of interest and an adverse effect resulting there-
rom, thus satisfying the two elements of the Sullivan test. Id.
40. Id., at *6.
41. Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies before applying for federal habeas
relief and that presentation of new legal theories or factual claims for the first time in his
federal habeas petition does not satisfy the exhaustion doctrine)).
42. Id.; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (discussing limita-
tions placed upon federal courts conducting habeas corpus review). The Court in Coleman
noted that federal courts may not address a claim if petitioner "failed to exhaust state
remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claim in
order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred."
Id. The Court also found that in "such a case there is a procedural default for purposes of
federal habeas regardless of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner actually
presented his claims." Id.
43. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *6; see also Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 5 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (2000)) (governing federal habeas petitions in death penalty cases).
44. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *6; seealso 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c) (2000) (explaining that
"an applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to
raise, by any available procedure, the question presented"); 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (2000)
(expl g that application for writ of federal habeas corpus shall not issue if applicant's
claim "was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim.., resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law); 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2) (2000) (explaining that writ of
habeas corpus shall not issue unless adjudication of applicant's claim in state court "resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding").




1Mickens's claim only through a mistake made by the JDR derk. As a
result, the Fourth Circuit considered the merits of Mickens's conflict of
interest claim."
B. Defendant Must Demonstrate an Adverse Effect Resulting from
Trial Counsel's Conflict of Interest
The general test for ineffective assistance of counsel was set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.4  In order fora
petitioner to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, peti-
tioner must establish the following: (1) that counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable; and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by
counsel's unreasonable performance.' Within the context of conflict of
interest claims, the Strickland test is modified so that the petitioner need not
establish that the conflict of interest resulted in prejudice." - ' Once the
petitioner has demonstrated that a conflict of interest in fact existed and that
the conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance, prejudice is
presumed and a new trial is required. '
Mickens argued that Holloway v. Arkansas" required automatic reversal
of his conviction.5' In Holloway, the United States Supreme Court held that
the trial court's failure to inquire into a conflict of interest despite repeated
objections by defense counsel violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial." The Fourth Circuit rejected Mickens's claim that his
conviction should be automatically reversed under Holloway because Judge
47. Id. "The fortuitous circumstances by which federal habeas counsel discovered the
truth about Saunders' conflict prove beyond question that Mickens did not fail in his duty
to inquire in the state court proceedings." Id. (citing Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586,
601 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
48. Id.
49. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that defendant's due
process right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when defendant can establish that
trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's performance
resulted in prejudice to defendant).
50. Id. at 688, 692.
51. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *8. The Sullivan court recognized this distinction
when it noted that [i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant
who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance.'" Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
'(1980)).
52. Id. (citing United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 1991)).
53. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
54. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *7; see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484
(1978) (holding that trial court's failure to appoint separate counsel for multiple defendants
in the ace of repeated assertions by counsel that potential for conflict of interest existed
violated defendants' due process rights).
55. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484.
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Foster knew or reasonably should have known of Saunders's conflict of
interest but failed to inquire into the situation.56 For the purpose of
Ivickens's appeal, the court accepted that Judge Foster reasonably should
have known of the potential conflict of interest created by Saunders's
previous representation of Hall.'7 However, the Fourth Circuit read
Holloway narrowly to require reversal of a defendant's conviction only
when a trial court fails to inquire into potential conflicts of interest when
a single attorney represents co-defendants and repeatedly objects to the
multiple representation.' The court read Holloway to require reversal only
after an objection is raised by defense counsel at trial. 9
The Fourth Circuit determined that absent an objection at trial a
defendant must satisfy the Sullivan two-pronged test.'° Mickens argued that
Wood v. Georgia61 changed the Sullivan test and extended the Holloway rule
of automatic reversal to cases in which the trial court does not address a
conflict of interest about which it reasonably should have known, even in
the absence of an objection by defense counsel at trial.'2 In Wood, the
United States Supreme Court remanded to the trial court because the record
established that the possibility of a conflict of interest was "sufficiently
apparent" so as to require the trial court to determine whether a conflict of
interest actually existed.' ,Mickens argued that Judge Foster knew or should
have known that Saunders's representation of Hall prior to his appointment
as Mickens's counsel created a conflict of interest and therefore that
Mickens should have been excused from proving that the conflict resulted
in an adverse effect.'4 The Fourth Circuit accepted that the record demon-
56. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id., at *8. The Fourth Circuit, in a footnote, explained that '[w]hile the cases seem
to emphasize the lack of objection, we think the fact of the associated failure to offer to a
defendant an opportunity to object to or waive objection to questionable representation is
also of consequence." Id., at *8 n.4. However, the court did not address the fact that Mickens
was not given the opportunity to object to Saunders's conflict of interest.
60. Id., at *8; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980) (holding that a defen-
dant may establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's conflict of
interest once the defendant can demonstrate an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect
on counsel's representation based on that conflict).
61. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
62. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *8. The footnote reads "Moreover, Sullivan mandates
a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.'- Id. (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450
U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1981) (remanding to determine if potential conflict of interest was
sufficiently apparent so that trial court's failure to inquire into potential conflict of interest
required reversal of defendant's conviction)). Mickens urged that the language of a footnote
in Wood explicitly extended the automatic reversal rule. Id.
63. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *8.
64. Id., at *7.
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, strated sufficient reason for the trial judge to suspect a conflict of interest,
but rejected Mickens's argument that the decision in Wood obviated the
requirement that a defendant demonstrate an actual conflict and adverse
effect."5 The Fourth Circuit decided that a literal application of the lan-
guage of footnote eighteen in Wood would lead to application beyond that
intended by the Supreme Court."6 The court reiterated that a defendant
must establish both prongs of the Sullivan test in order to obtain relief on
a claim of conflict of interest.'7
The Fourth Circuit approved of the district court's articulation of the
standard for demonstrating an adverse effect." First, the defendant must
show that a plausible defense tactic or strategy existed that counsel could
have pursued 9 Then, the defendant must show that the tactic or strategy
was objectively reasonable at the time the decision was made not to pursue
that avenue.' Finally, the defendant must establish that failure to pursue
that tactic or strategy was a result of the attorney's conflict of interest."'
The Fourth Circuit-determined that the district court had correctly evalu-
ated the arguments raised by Mickens.' The court agreed that trial counsel
failed to raise the defense of consent to the sodomy charge because the
strategy was not viable based on the wounds inflicted on Hall and Mickens's
denial of ever meeting Hall."3 The court also found that counsel's failure to
present negative information about Hall would have been inconsistent with
Mickens's assertion of sympathy for Hall's family.74 Thus, the court deter-
mined that Mickens had not demonstrated an adverse effect as required
under Sullivan and did not address whether an actual conflict of interest in
fact existed." As a result, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the
district court denying Mickens's petition for habeas relief.'
C. Mickens's Defaulted Claims
Mickens argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct
an adequate pre-trial investigation." The district court held that this claim
was defaulted because Mcens failed to present fairly the claim to the
65. Id., at *9.
66. Id.
67. id.




72. Id., at *13-14.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id., at *10.
76. Id., at *14.
77. Id., at *13.
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Virginia courts.78 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court with respect to this claim.' Mickens also argued that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to obtain a psychiatric expert to perform an
evaluation for the resentencing80 The court found that Mickens had not
shown that a mental health expert would have provided any additional
information to counsel.8 ' Mickens argued that the evidence was insufficient
to prove an attempted forcible sodomy. 2 This argument was rejected by
the court because the claim was not fairly presented in the state habeas
proceeding.8 3 Finally, Mickens argued that the ineffective assistance of state
habeas counsel established cause for his failure to raise in state habeas the
additional ineffective assistance claims raised for the first time in the federal
habeas proceedings." The Fourth Circuit rejected this claim, notin5 that
"ineffective assistance by state habeas counsel fails to establish cause.
IV Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit reiterated that under Sullivan the trial judge has a
duty to inquire into situations that might reasonably involve a conflict 6f
interest." Mickens indicates that in cases of multiple or successive represen-
tation the trial judge is under an affirmative duty to inquire into possible
conflicts of interest." However, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
trial judge's failure to inquire is subject to harmless error analysis once an
actual conflict of interest is claimed. The conflict of interest is almost
certain to arise in cases of multiple representation because each defendant's
strategy will almost certainly be to implicate his co-defendants. When one
attorney represents multiple defendants in the same trial, this strategy
78. Mickens, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 598; see Mickens, 2001.WL 133196, at *13.
79. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *13.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court also noted that this claim was adjudicated against Mickens on the
merits in state court. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), a federal court is prohibited from
issuing a writ of habeas corpus for a claim adjudicated on the merits in the state court. Only
when the adjudication at the state level results in a decision that is "contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law" may the federal court grant the
application for a writ of habeas corpus. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, S 107(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1221 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
S 2254(d)(1) (2000)) (governing federal habeas petitions in death penalty cases).
82. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *14.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442,449 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding
that petitioner has no right to effective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceeding and
therefore cannot claim that state habeas counsel was constitutionally ineffective in order to
establish cause to excuse procedural default)).
86. Mickens, 2001 WL 133196, at *8.
87. Id., at "9.
88. Id., at *11.
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cannot be pursued by the attorney. The duty owed to each defendant
prevents the attorney from engaging in finger-pointing. The majority
further held that a defendant must show an adverse effect as a result of the
attorney's conflict of interest before his conviction will be reversed.3s The
majority was not persuaded by Judge Michael's dissent which argued that
the trial judge's duty under Holloway and Wood is a constitutional obliga-




Practitioners should note that the Fourth Circuit considered the
evidence of the conflict of interest even though the claim was not raised on
direct appeal in the state courts. Mickens was allowed to raise the claim
notwithstanding the fact that habeas counsel was able to discover the
conflict.9' The court refused to attribute to the defendant his trial counsel's
failure to reveal the potential conflict of interest.
V. Epilogue
On April 16, 2001, the United States Supreme Court issued a stay of
execution and granted certiorari on the issue of whether "a defendant must
show an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect in order to establish
a Sixth Amendment violation where a trial court fails to inquire into a
potential conflict of interest about which it reasonably should have
known."'
Matthew S. Nichols
89. Id., at *10.
90. Id., at *9.
91. Id., at *6.
92. Mickens v. Taylor, No. 00-9285, 2001 WL 348936 (Apr. 16, 2001).
402 [Vol. 13:2
